83. Violations of Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights by Defendants Injure Plaintiff, Causing Her Damages. Defendants are Liable Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, commonly referred to as "section 1983" provides:

Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any Stateor Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.  For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

(i) "Every person . . ."

84. Defendants Bodin, Marshall, Ecoffey, Big Crow, Cook, Apple, Russell, Daggot, and Terrall are persons under 1983 who therefore subject to liability. A state is not a person, but a state officer can be sued in his official capacity for prospective or injunctive relief ^{[Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).]} Defendants Russell, Daggot, and Terrall, state officials, are sued in their individual and official capacity. Municipalities and local governments are persons subject to suit for damages and prospective relief,^{[Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).]} The United States Government and individual federal employees defendants Bodin, Marshall, and Ecoffey are sued under ^{Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).} state: defendants Russell, Daggot, and Terrall; and tribal government: defendants Lisa Cook, Gerald Big Crow, Ann Apple; are sued in their individual capacitiesfor damages, declaratory or injunctive relief. Government officials, the Defendants, are sued in their individual capacity. Private parties, defendants Red Cloud Indian School, Fr. Peter Klink, Didier Dupont, Connie Whirlwind Horse, Dale Vocu, and Louise Big Boy, were willful participants in joint activity with the State, Tribe, the BIA, and its agents, and are sued in their individual capacity. All denied me my constitutional rights.

85. ^{South Dakota law provides that divisions of local governments, such as police departments, have the capacity to be sued.}

(ii) ". . . who under color of [state and territorial law]

^{86. Section 1983's requirement that a person act "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory or District of Columbia" is commonly abbreviated as "under color of state law" applies to States Attorney Lance Russell, Sheriff James Daggot, Sheriff Jeffery Terrall, tribal judge Lisa Cook, tribal prosecutor Ann Apple, OST executive officer Gerald Big Crow, OST Tribal Police, Captain Milton Bianis. All Indians living on reservations are citizens of the U.S. Tribal government officers and tribal court and police officers take an Oath of Office to uphold and protect the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, by definition, Indians and Indian tribal governments are guided by the U.S. Constitution and statutes. Tribal law cannot be said to be Federal law; nor can it be said to be State law; it is a law of limited jurisdiction to police and order its internal affairs, while obeying U.S. Statues and upholding the U.S. Constitution.} To say otherwise, would leave out Indian tribes as having no responsibility to the Constitution and Indians and non-Indians living on a reservation, as having no access to a Court for redress of grievances to hear violations of their constitutional rights. It would also leave me as a nonmember, with no court to hear my claims, which would be a violation of my rights by the Court itself to deny me the opportunity for due process and equal protection.

87. The traditional definition of acting under the color of state law requires that the defendant have exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law (and tribal law through ICRA) and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,, (and tribal law through ICRA). A private actor may also act under color of state, territory, or D.C. law under certain circumstances.^{<[ Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 162 (1992); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982).]} Fr. Klink and Red Cloud Indian School were acting under the authority of the BIA and Oglala Sioux Tribe, when they sold 2 acres to OST for the sum of $1.00, knowing that my house sitting on those 2 acres, a house worth thousands of dollars. Oglala Sioux Tribe and/or Louise Big Boy was falsely enriched. They knew they had not offered me a chance to be heard before they sold my house to the tribe for $1.00. For all practical purposes, the "color of state law" requirement is identical to the "state action" prerequisite to constitutional liability.^{<!--[Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982).]}

(iii) ". . . subjects or causes to be subjected . . ."

88. The harm suffered by the Plaintiff was a result of the action on the part of Oglala sioux Tribe, aided by Red Cloud Indian School, Fall River County, and the BIA that implemented or executed a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers, and the damages that ensued were the result of the OST, County, and BIA custom. ^{<!--[Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-691, (1978). (Number 132 itemizes each} defendant's role in the harm that resulted.) The harm to Plaintiff was the result of action the the part of Oglala Sioux Tribe, County of Fall River, and BIA, along with Red Cloud Indian School, who after the termination of federal funding, the school continued to prosper through private contributions from St. Katherine , federal disbursement of tribal funds held in trust, and operation of a mission ranch. In short, Red Cloud Indian School, a private religious institution, answers to the BIA, and functions under the State Dept. of Education. The BIA policy, County of Fall River policy, IRA tribal government, (Oglala Sioux Tribe) policy, and Church custom have upheld the policy that tribal governments do not have to abide by the Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because of a falsely held policy that Oglala Sioux Tribe is the government of choice by the people. The IRA (Indian Reorganization Act, 1934) was created by the BIA as a form of government for Indian tribes, replacing their traditional forms of government. As such, Oglala Sioux Tribe has limited jurisdiction over their own internal affairs, and limited sovereignty. Their sovereignty is not the same as Canada or Mexico. They owe their allegiance to the United States, and are totally dependent upon the U.S. Government for funding. Over time, OST has usurped jurisdiction over nonmembers that is unwarranted. The tribal defendants were the “moving force” behind my deprivations. ^{[Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.]}

89. OST Public Safety has an unconstitutional policy of failing to train its officers, and the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to an obvious need for such training, and the failure train will likely result in the officers making a wrong decision. Three times OST officers came to my house, with a gang of tribal members, who wanted the officers to remove me without a hearing, warrant, or court order, violation of my Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteen Amendment Rights. Finally on June lst, OST officers came to my house, pried the locks off my doors, and allowed defendants Louise Big Boy, Robert Montileaux, Whirlwind Horse, Vocu, and others to enter my house and steal my possessions, which is an example of their training. When I reported this, they came and arrested me because they said I didn't have a right to be there in the first place because I am a (white) nonmember, and, following their policy, they just follow orders without any examination of whether they violate my constitutional rights or whether the judge had jurisdiction, or whether I was given due process, all of which they violated. They arrested me without a warrant and without probable cause, placed me in a vehicle without stating the reason or the destination. The officer who arrested me, read Miranda rights, yet failed to state the reason for my arrest. When I asked, his reason was that he was just following orders. Such flagrant violations happen all the time because OST and OST Public Safety do not properly train their officers about constitutional rights, knowing they can claim sovereign immunity, and therefore they don't have to know anything about the U.S. Constitution or even tribal law. They just follow orders. It is standard practice and policy that no one questions an order of a superior officer or of tribal court. OST Public Safety also refused to turn over police records when I requested them, because of sovereign immunity policies, they feel they don't have to. Because of tribal defendants actions, failing to uphold the U.S. Constitution and defend and protect my person and property, I was damaged as shown in subsection VI. ^{[City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Gold v. City of Miami, 1998 WL 54803 (11th Cir. 1998); Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488 (11th. Cir. 1997).}

90. States Attorney Lance Russell who is "final policymaker," for the County of Fall River. Russell made the decision that Sheriff Daggot should arrest me without a warrant, based on a tribal court order, not a state court order, and take me to Hot Springs jail, when Fall River County lacked jurisdiction in the matter. I was jailed anyway by Sheriff Terrall, who later refused to turn over police records. Both Sheriffis said they were just following orders instead of determining for themselves whether their actions were unconstitutional or not. Lance Russell failed to inform his officers that the County of Fall River does not take orders from the Tribe, and that the County of Fall River does not have jurisdiction over tribal court orders. Russell failed to instruct his officers that their duty is to uphold and defend the U.S. Constitution, which includes protecting the constitutional rights of nonmembers living on an Indian Reservation, who ask that the sheriff and States Attorney protect her property. Lance Russell told me that he could not prevent the conspiracy to deprive me of my property, because the State did not have jurisdiction over tribal matters. Yet, he didn't hesitate to have me arrested and jailed, without jurisdiction, because he was part of the conspiracy to get rid of Plaintiff, even if it meant using unconstitutional methods. What mattered more to the Sheriffs than the U.S. Constitution, was that they follow Russell's orders, which was to arrest and jail me on a misdemeanor charge, without jurisdiction or probable cause, and hold me in the Fall River County jail, while defendants Louise Big Boy, Robert Montileaux, Connie Whirlwind Horse, and Dale Vocu were stealing my possessions and had taken possession of my house. ^{[Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). Such actions are punishable under the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. 1983, U.S. Statutes, Willful Failure to Uphold the U.S. Constitution is Fraud Upon the Court and Treason.}

(iv). . . [any person to] the deprivation of rights . . ."

91. I was deprived of rights secured by the United States Constitution and federal statutes as enumerated in this Complaint. My First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the defendants as enumerated in #132, all without Due Process. The Fourteenth Amendment limits the deeds of state defendants States Attorney Lance Russell, Sheriff Daggot, and Sheriff Terrall, who should have known they were violating my rights, while defendants Big Boy, Whirlwind Horse, Vocu, and others were inhabiting my house, using my appliances and electricity, phone, and stealing my possessions. The Fifth Amendment Due Process clause limits the actionable deeds of federal defendants Bodin, Marshall, and Ecoffey. The authority of Indian tribes is limited by ICRA, the Indian Civil Rights Act.

92. I was deprived of my Due Process guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and ICRA.

1. I possessed a constitutionally protected property interest, my 2 story house and sheds which I built myself. (see Exhibit F )

2. I was deprived of my 2 story house, my property, without due process of law, as evidenced in my statement of facts. ^{[Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).]}

3. I was given no opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of my case.^{[Loudermill, 470 U.S. At 542.]}

4. The state, federal, and tribal governments have not provided a post-deprivation remedy, a tort remedy in its own courts.

5. ^{Instead of compensation for my house, the Tribe, excluded me from the Pine Ridge Reservation, to punish me for having brought a lawsuit against them.}

6. ^{I asked for a post deprivation remedy, but was refused. I was denied a pre-deprivation hearing.}

^{93. In my claim for deprivation of Due Process, the state action present are:}

^{a. Fall River County, a state government entity, where the Fall River Jail is located, where Plaintiff was falsely incarcerated in violation of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.}

^{b. States Attorney Lance Russell, state officer}

^{c. Sheriff James Daggot, state officer}

^{d. Sheriff Jeffery Terrall, state officer}

^{e. Red Cloud Indian School, a private entity, who has a public function.}

^{f. Father Peter Klink, a private party, was a willful participant to joint activity with Oglala Sioux Tribe and the BIA in denying Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Fr. Klink sold the 2 acres, along with my house, to the Tribe, for $1.00. His motivation was neither profit or good will, but to aid BIA and Oglala Sioux Tribe to get rid of Plaintiff, thus becoming part of the conspiracy.1}

^{g. Didier Dupont, a private party, working closely with BIA Area Director Bob Ecoffey, closes down Plaintiff's website Lakota Perspectives, and demanded she stop writing in the local newspaper, to prevent Plaintiff from writing about Ecoffey's investigation of Anna Mae Aquash's murder and railroading Arlo Looking Cloud, thus violating Plaintiff's First Amendment rights of speech and press.(4)}

^95. In addition to protection against deprivations of procedural due process, I had a right to substantive due process. I had a right to expect that government and court officials would do their duty to protect me and my property. Instead, the defendants engaged in conduct that was "arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense." ^{[Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992); Rymer v. Douglas County, 764 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1985).]} The existence of adequate post-deprivation remedies does not bar a substantive due process claim.^{<!--[ McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994).]}

96. With respect to incorporated substantive due process, the plaintiff has stated a claim by proving a violations of all but two amendments of the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has held that one of the substantive elements of the Due Process Clause protects those rights that are fundamental--rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and has, over time, held that virtually all of the Bill of Rights protect such fundamental rights and has likewise held that they apply to the states through the "liberty" interest of the Due Process Clause.^{<!--[Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and the Sixth Amendment right to know who the accuser is, and a right to be presumed innocent, the right to be free, which was denied me by States Attorney Lance Russell, Sheriff James Daggot, and Sheriff Jeffery Terrall.}

97. In addition to providing a remedy for deprivations of constitutional rights, section 1983 also makes actionable violations of federal "Laws."^{<!--[Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).]} Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. 241, 242, Mail Fraud, Obstruction of Justice, but not limited to. A violation of a federal statute is cognizable when the violation trammels a right secured by federal law.^{<!-[Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 101, 106 (1989)}

(v) " . . . shall be liable . . . in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . "

98. Also, the existence of concurrent state remedies is not a bar to a section 1983 action.^{<!--[Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124 (1990).]} With respect to the extent of damages available, I am a victim of Official Misconduct by the very authorities who are supposed to investigate fraud, larceny, and assault, naming Russell, Daggot, Terrall, Oglala Sioux Tribe, Big Crow, Cook, Apple, OST Public Safety, and Bianis, who, while acting under color of stat or territorial law, did deprive me of my constitutional rights, causing the damage. ^{[Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).]} I ask that punitive damages be awarded. ^{[Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981). Oglala Sioux Tribe, BIA, OST Public Safety and the County of Fall River are jointly and severally liable. Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1989).} Injunctive relief is also permitted.

DEFENSES AND IMMUNITIES UNDER 42 U.S.C. 1983

99. States and state agencies are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court, but local governments have no immunity from damages flowing from their constitutional violations, and may not assert the good faith of its agents as a defense to liability, States Attorney Lance Russell, Sheriff James Daggot, and Sheriff Jeff Terrall; ^{Owen v. City of Independence, MO, 445 U.S. 621 (1980); Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 699-700 (1978).]} Fall River County, Oglala Sioux Tribe, OST Public Safety, BIA, are liable for damages under section 1983,^{<!--[Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); Hamm v. Powell, 874 F.2d 766, 770 (11th Cir. 1989).]} and state laws requiring pre-suit notification prior to initiating an action against the state or its subdivisions similarly do not apply.^{[Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).]}Therefore, local governments, Fall River County, is left in the unique and unhappy situation of being subject to suit without the benefit of any form of immunity.

100. In contrast to the distinct lack of immunity available to local governments, individual capacity defendants are protected by qualified immunity, unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ^{[Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817; Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149.]} OST Public Safety and tribal police officers, acted upon void orders, without jurisdiction, fully dressed in police regalia and packing guns, did used their authority to arrest the Plaintiff without probable cause, with no warrant, without jurisdiction, did force Plaintiff into police car and take her somewhere against her will, transporting her in a circuitous route, changing directions different times, and being transported from one car to another, finally transporting her to the Pine Ridge Jail, a tribal facility, where Plaintiff was booked in and detained in a cell for several hours, against her will. OST Tribal Police, under direction from, OST Captain Milton Bianis, failed to apprehend defendants who were stealing Plaintiff's property, failed to protect Plaintiff and her property, and prevented Plaintiff from getting her belongings. OST Tribal Police refused to investigate or charge perpetrators of felony crime for assaulting Plaintiff with threats and force, and who stole Plaintiff’s legal documents.  The OST Tribal Police had no probable cause to arrest and jail Janis Schmidt; she had committed no crime.  OST Tribal Police have a duty to protect nonmembers and their property if they reside on the Pine Ridge Reservation.  Plaintiff was a 14 year resident. Such behavior by an exhibited by the defendants shocks the conscience of an ordinary citizen.

101. The Sheriffs had no cause to arrest and jail Janis Schmidt; she had committed no crime and certainly no crime within the jurisdiction of Hot Springs or Shannon County, South Dakota, yet States Attorney Lance Russell, acting on void orders from tribal court, ordered Plaintiff to be charged with State of South Dakota law, Failure to Vacate, arrested, incarcerated, bond set according to S.D. laws.² All defendants contributed, and willfully designed the arrest and incarceration of Plaintiff Schmidt.Lance Russell failed to investigate when Plaintiff told him about the conspiracy to commit fraud in March of 2004. He told Plaintiff that the State could do nothing because the Reservation is outside Fall River's jurisdiction. Then, under color of state law, Sheriff Daggot, under orders from Lance Russell, who suddenly decided that tribal court orders were his jurisdiction, removed Plaintiff from the tribal Pine Ridge Jail, imposed by force an unlawful restraint upon her freedom of movement, to wit by arresting without a warrant, against her will, and handcuffing Plaintiff, transporting her to Hot Springs County Jail, taken inside and told to sit on a metal chair, still handcuffed. Plaintiff was finger printed and mug shots taken, thus, a record on Plaintiff was created, which for 2 years state defendants refused to turn over to Plaintiff.Plaintiff was booked into jail, charged with Failure to Vacate a non-jailable misdemeanor and was incarcerated in the Hot Springs County Jail for 2 and ½ days. Bail was set at $250, and Plaintiff was assigned a court appointed attorney, Ginsbaugh from the law firm of Ginsbaugh and Farrel from Hot Springs. Prosecutor Lance Russell did not like Plaintiff's stories of how he and the County of Fall River treated Indians the same racist way as the South treated the Black in the sixties, and he misused his office to get a record on the Plaintiff, a well known artist, teacher and gardener, who was instructing Indians on their constitutional rights, and urging them to stand up for their rights. Such behavior shocks the conscience of the average person that a prosecutor would misuse the power, privilege, and immunities of his office to fail to protect a poor woman contitutional right of liberty, property, and due process. In fact, Russell was the one denying Plaintiff her liberty, while tribal members stole her property. A government official is entitled to qualified immunity unless his "act is so obviously wrong, in the light of preexisting law, that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done such a thing."^{<!--[Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149; Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1406 (11th Cir. 1998) Deary v. Three Un-named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 191 (3d. Cir. 1984). See Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 455 U.S. 622, 638 (1980); City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259 (1981).}

102. The burden of pleading sovereign immunity rest with the defendants, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. It is for the official to claim that his conduct was justified by an objectively reasonable belief that it was lawful. BIA officers, Larry Bodin, Robert Ecoffey, and Frieda Brewer Marshall are not entitled to official immunity for the following reasons:

1. The actions of BIA officers Bodin, Ecoffey, and Marshall violated clearly established Constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have known and recognized.

2. Bodin, Ecoffey, and Marshall took the described actions with the malicious intention to cause injury to Plaintiff and to cause deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

3. Bodin, Ecoffey, and Marshall had no discretion to act as they did since they violated, ignored and otherwise failed to comply with regulations and policies designed to guide their actions, the C.F.R. Handbook. The cover-up tactics used to “legitimize” the illegal ‘trespass’ letter were so extreme that no reasonable person would accept them as fair and lawful.

4. BIA Realty Officer Frieda Brewer Marshall took certain unlawful and improper actions on her own accord with direction from her supervisors, Bodin and Ecoffey, but without the direction of the United States Department of the Interior, including, but not limited to (1) writing a faulty trespass letter, (2) falsifying land records by conducting a survey which she is not trained for; additionally, the survey could not prove anything since there were no markers on the original deed, and (3) deliberately lying to Plaintiff by telling Plaintiff she was living on Louise Big Boy’s land.

5. BIA Officers Bodin, Ecoffey, and Marshall instigated and negotiated a land transaction that lay outside the guidelines of the C.F.R. and to cover-up the illegal mailing of a fraudulent BIA letter of Trespass, thereby losing his/her objectivity and violating his/her duty to fairly uphold the laws of the United States.

6. BIA Superintendent Larry Bodin acted in a non-committal role during an informal hearing with Plaintiff and lawyer, Barry Bachrach, when he withheld critical information when he failed to answer Mr. Bachrach’s questions in an honest way, “What does Ms. Schmidt need to do to comply with trespass? And, if she has to move, how will she be notified?”

7. BIA Supt. Bodin continually provided inaccurate and misleading information to Plaintiff on the status of the land where her house was located, claiming that he didn’t know who owned the land, when he was, in fact, making a fraudulent land transaction with Oglala Sioux Tribe, through the Executive Office of Fifth Member employee, Gerald Big Crow, who was also acting as Louise Big Boy’s attorney, and working closely with tribal judge Lisa Cook with a surprise eviction of the Plaintiff.

8. Area BIA Director, Bob Ecoffey approved all illegal activities.

103. OST tribal officials Judge Lisa Cook, prosecutor Ann Apple, Executive officer Gerald Big Crow, OST Public Safety officers and Captain Miltain Bianis are not entitled to sovereign immunity for the following reasons:

1. Tribal judge Lisa Cook willfully committed perjury on an Affidavit, falsely swearing that she had never been removed from office. OST tribal officials Judge Lisa Cook, prosecutor Ann Apple, Executive officer Gerald Big Crow, OST Public Safety officers and Captain Miltain Bianis fraudulently sought to amend their Answer to deny that Cook had ever been removed from office.

2. The actions of Judge Cook were not based on law; additionally, she lacked both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.

3. The actions of OST officials Cook, Apple, Big Crow, OST Public Safety officers and Captain Bianis, and Gerald Big Crow violated clearly established Constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have known and recognized.

4. OST tribal judge Cook was removed from office at the time she wrote the 2^nd Court Order.

5. OST tribal judge Cook, OST prosecutor Apple, OST Tribal Police and Capt. Bianis, and Gerald Big Crow took the described actions with the malicious intention to cause injury to Plaintiff and to cause deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

6. OST tribal officials Cook, Apple, Tribal Police, Bianis, and Big Crow had no discretion to act as they did since they violated, ignored and otherwise failed to comply with regulations and policies designed to guide their actions. Eviction and removal tactics used were so extreme that no reasonable person would accept them as fair and lawful.

7. OST Public Safety officers and Captain Bianis undertook certain unlawful and improper actions on their own accord without direction from OST Tribal Council, including, but not limited to prying the locks off Plaintiff’s doors, and allowing Louise Big Boy, Robert Montileaux to enter Plaintiff’s house for the purpose of seizing Plaintiff’s belongings; attempting to remove Plaintiff without a court order or warrant; arresting Plaintiff without a warrant or court order.

8. Oglala Sioux Tribe and OST Tribal Court incorrectly, prematurely, and unconstitutionally interfered in an Administrative action taken by the BIA, when tribal judge Lisa Cook incorrectly applied tribal court measure to a matter which was in jurisdiction of the BIA, and not in the jurisdiction of tribal Court.

9. OST tribal judge Cook ruled without jurisdiction or law, and ordered Plaintiff’s property to be seized without due process; OST Public Safety officers and Capt. Bianis obeyed and carried out this outrageous, void order without question, thereby losing their objectivity and violating their duty to fairly uphold the laws of Oglala Sioux Tribe and the U.S. Constitution, which they take an Oath to uphold; Gerald Big Crow falsified records and documents to create a land conversion, an action that is not lawful.

10. OST tribal judge Cook continually provided inaccurate and misleadinglegal advice and unconstitutional Orders to the Public Safety officers who were given the task or carrying out void orders.

11. OST tribal judge Cook gave orders to Sheriff Daggot and OST Tribal Police while under suspension.

12. OST tribal judge Cook additionally acted individually in a manner unbefitting and degrading to the Bench, including, but not limited to (1) fraternizing with parties of Action before the Court; (2) calling Plaintiff’s attorney to induce a certain outcome; and (3) spreading libel and defamation of character by posting Court Orders of Plaintiff along with racist, biased, false and misleading commentary about the Plaintiff which damaged Plaintiff’s character and reputation, posting on www.vivelecanada.ca web site.

104. State officials, states attorney Lance Russell, Sheriff James Terrall, and Sheriff James Daggot are not entitled to official immunity for the following reasons:

a. ^{Prosecutors are entitled to immunity for activities that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," but a prosecutor engaged in investigative or administrative activities is only entitled to a good faith defense. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). See also, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997).]Hartman v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 960 F.Supp 1577, 1582 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Smith v. United States, 850 F.Supp 984, 986 (M.D. Fla. 1994).}

b. State officials lacked jurisdiction.

c. The actions of State officials Russell, Terrall, and Daggot were taken upon void tribal orders, in absence of jurisdiction and law, thus violating clearly established Constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have known and recognized.

d. States Attorney Lance Russell, and Sheriffs Terrall and Daggot, took described actions which did cause injury to Plaintiff and to cause deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

e. States Attorney Lance Russell failed to exhaust Administrative remedies with whom BIA has original jurisdiction over all land issues, not the State of South Dakota or the County of Hot Spring.

f. Daggot, and Terrall lacked jurisdiction to arrest, charge with crime, and incarcerate the Plaintiff. In the alternative, they acted upon void orders from a tribal judge who, part of the time, was under suspension.

g. State officials Russell, Terrall, and Daggot presumed jurisdiction over Plaintiff when they arrested and incarcerated her and charged her with Failure to Vacate, from State of South Dakota law, a nonjailable misdemeanor, and placed a bond of $250. Rightfully, jurisdiction was with BIA, not the State of South Dakota. These tactics used were so extreme under the circumstances that no reasonable person would accept them as fair or lawful.

h. States Attorney Lance Russell, and Sheriffs Daggot and Terrall, acted unlawfully when they refused to turn over records to the Plaintiff, thus withholding exculpatory evidence.

i. State officials Russell, Daggott and Terrall continually provided inaccurate and misleading information to the District Court regarding Plaintiff’s records, and withheld the truth from the Court which is perjury.

105. Corporation Red Cloud Indian School and private individual Father Peter Klink are not entitled to qualified immunity because:

a. They aided and abetted in a conspiracy to commit larceny.

b. As a private corporation and private party, qualified immunity does not apply.

2  The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has held that state courts have no jurisdiction over "controversies necessarily involving a determination of the title and incidentally of the right to the possession" of Indian trust land.